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A vállalati társadalmi teljesítmény rövid 
távú hatásai a pénzügyi jövedelmezőségre
The Short-term Effects of Corporate Social 
Performance on Financial Profitability
A menedzsment elméletek szerint az erős vállalati társadalmi teljesítmény (CSP) javítja a 
pénzügyi jövedelmezőséget. Továbbá, a felelősen viselkedő vállalkozások hozzájárulhat-
nak a gazdaságok fenntartható növekedéséhez, amely az ENSZ fenntartható fejlődésre 
vonatkozó, 2030-ig terjedő keretrendszerének is prioritása (Agenda 2030). Bár a CSP kife-
jezést alkalmazzuk, más szorosan kapcsolódó tényezőkre is hivatkozunk, így a vállalkozá-
sok környezetvédelmi és vállalatirányirányítási politikáira; éppen ezért a tanulmányban 
mindvégig az ESG-koncepciót (környezeti, társadalmi és vállalatirányítási faktorok) fog-
juk használni. Megvizsgáljuk, hogy valóban létezik-e a szakirodalomban domináns pozitív 
kapcsolat a vállalkozások ESG és pénzügyi teljesítménye között. Az elemzéshez az MSCI 
ACWI Indexből származó 1.099 elemű vállalati mintát használunk, amely 2018-ra terjed 
ki. A regressziós számítások a súlyozott legkevesebb négyzetek (WLS) módszerén alapul-
nak. A függő változó az árbevétel-arányos adózott eredmény (ROS, 2018); a kontrollválto-
zók az előző évi (2017) jövedelmezőség, méret, tőkeáttétel, növekedés, tőkeintenzitás, ipar-
ági és regionális dummy változók. Az eredményeink azt mutatják, hogy a magasabb ESG, 
E és S teljesítmény rövid távon nem módosítják jelentősen a pénzügyi jövedelmezőséget. A 
vállalatirányításnak azonban jelentős és pozitív hatása van 5,00 százalékos szignifikancia 
szint mellett: a G-pontszám 10-pontos növekedése 0,30 százalékponttal növeli a ROS-t. 
Egy másik ugyancsak fontos következtetés: a társadalmi és környezeti tényezők, amelyeket 
gyakran színtiszta költségekként értelmeznek, nem csökkentik jelentősen a rövid távú jöve-
delmezőséget. Ez utóbbi megállapítás azt sugallja, hogy a vállalatoknak érdemes ESG-tu-
datos projektekbe fektetniük, hiszen nem járnak profitcsökkenéssel, de hozzájárulhatnak 
az Egyesült Nemzetek Szervezete Fenntartható Fejlődési Céljainak (SDG) az eléréséhez.
Management theories emphasise that strong corporate social performance (CSP) enhances 
financial profitability. Further, responsible firms have the potential to promote sustainable 
growth which is the priority of the United Nations’ 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Develop-
ment. Although we apply the term CSP, we also refer to other closely linked factors such 
as environmental and governance policies. For this reason, we use the ESG concept (en-
vironmental, social and governance) throughout the study and test whether the dominant 
hypothesis of positive ESG-financial performance relationship exists. The analysis covers 
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2018 company-level data and performed on a 1,099-element firm sample from the MSCI 
ACWI Index. Regression calculations rest on the weighted least squares (WLS) method. 
The dependent variable is the return on sales (ROS, 2018); the control variables are pre-
vious year (2017) profitability, size, leverage, growth, capital intensity, industry and regi-
onal dummies. The empirical results show that higher ESG, E, and S ratings do not change 
profitability significantly in the short run. However, corporate governance has a significant 
and positive effect at 5.00 per cent: a 10-point increase in G score increases ROS by 0.30 
percentage points. Another important conclusion is that social and environmental factors, 
which often interpreted as mere costs, do not significantly reduce short-term profitability. 
This latter finding implies that companies should invest in ESG projects as they will not 
experience evaporating profits but might contribute to achieving some of the Sustainable 
Development Goals of the United Nations.
Introduction
According to global advisory firms [Collins and Allen, 2020: 17; Henisz et al., 2019], valuation 
professionals are becoming more ESG-conscious, as 75 per cent consider somehow environmen-
tal, social and governance factors while evaluating corporates. Statistical figures on sustainable 
investing also underpin the importance of ESG. GSIA [2018] report shows that the total assets 
under management (AUM) based on sustainable investing strategies more than doubled by 2018 
compared to 2012, reaching $30,000 billion, which roughly equals to 33 per cent of the global 
AUM (this figure was 21 per cent in 2012).
Policymakers are also keen on ESG issues, since solving global environmental, social, and 
governance challenges contribute to achieve and maintain sustainable economies and societies. 
One of the prominent sustainability programmes is the United Nations’ (UN) ‘Transforming 
our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’. In this agenda, the UN defines 17 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Here are some that are closely related to corporate ESG 
performance [United Nations, 2015: 14]: guarantee gender equality (SDG5); promote sustained, 
inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment and decent work 
for all (SDG8); ensure sustainable consumption and production patterns (SDG12), take urgent 
action to combat climate change and its impacts (SDG13).
However, the concept of ESG is not entirely new since many scholars have analysed it thor-
oughly but under different names (ethical, socially responsible, sustainable or responsible invest-
ing) and focusing on only one of its elements. Comprehensive literature review articles such as 
Friede et al. [2015], Griffin and Mahon [1997], Margolis and Walsh [2003], Orlitzky et al. [2003], 
Renneboog et al. [2008]; Revelli and Viviani [2013]summarised the key hypotheses and findings.
There are three competing hypotheses on the direction of the relationship (positive, nega-
tive or no effect) and the type of causality (ESG performance affects profitability or vice versa, 
or synergetic, interdependent as a third type of dependence). Stakeholder theory [Clarkson, 
1995; Freeman, 2010; Hillman and Keim, 2001; Mitchell et al., 1997], good management the-
ory [Waddock and Graves, 1998] as wells as the resource-based view of firms [Barney, 1991; 
Hart, 1995; Hart and Dowell, 2011; Wernerfelt, 1984 as wells as the resource-based view of firms 
[Barney, 1991; Hart, 1995; Hart and Dowell, 2011; Wernerfelt, 1984] maintain that the satisfac-
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tion of primary stakeholders (for instance, customers, employees, local communities, sharehold-
ers) is essential in realising superior financial performance.
Slack resources theory [Günther et al., 2012; Orlitzky et al., 2003; Preston and O’Bannon, 
1997; Ullmann, 1985; Waddock and Graves, 1998] also emphasises a positive relationship 
between corporate ESG and financial performance; however, it assumes reverse causation, that 
is, financial profitability determines ESG performance. Previous outstanding financial perfor-
mance provides excess cash (as a slack resource) necessary to become a responsible company.
The next hypothesis assumes a negative relationship meaning that higher ESG scores depress 
financial performance. This is the underlying theory of the trade-off hypothesis and the man-
agement opportunism hypothesis. The trade-off hypothesis [Aupperle et al., 1985; Dam, 2008; 
Friedman, 1970; Preston and O’Bannon, 1997; Vance, 1975] claims that reaching and maintain-
ing higher ESG performance is costly, as resource reallocation to responsible activities such as 
community development or charity is not profitable but, on the contrary, generates higher oper-
ating expenditures due to internalisation of externalities.
Managerial opportunism hypothesis [Günther et al., 2012; Makni et al., 2009; Preston and 
O’Bannon, 1997 rests on the assumption that corporate managers usually chase their private 
interests and do not care much about stakeholders. In periods when financial performance is 
robust, managers tend to cut off social expenses to take full advantage of their short-term private 
interest. However, when financial performance decays, managers might engage in noteworthy 
but not necessarily profitable social programs to offset their underperformance. The opportun-
ism hypothesis, like the slack resource theory, emphasises reverse causation.
The ‘no effect’ principle of McWilliams and Siegel [2001, 2000] claims that incorporating 
R&D factors in the analysis of the ESG versus financial performance relationship eradicates any 
significant relationship and results in neutrality. In their 2001 paper, the authors outline a supply 
and demand model of corporate social responsibility and hypothesise that firm-level ESG per-
formance depends on several factors such as size, level of diversification, research and develop-
ment, advertising. The conclusion, yet again, is that there is no significant relationship between 
ESG and financial performance. However, they admit that the hypotheses are difficult to test 
empirically due to the lack of data. Some other empirical studies also found a neutral relation-
ship [for instance, Bebchuk et al., 2013; Garcia-Castro et al., 2010; Johnson et al., 2009; Menz, 
2010] The size factor was shown to be a market pricing anomaly in Naffa [2009]. 
Another critical issue is how to measure financial performance. Günther et al. [2012] or 
Peloza [2009]summarises the most commonly used metrics.  They classify financial performance 
indicators into three groups: accounting ratios (including ROS, ROE, ROIC), measures that use 
both stock exchange and accounting data (e.g. P/E, EV/EBITDA), and metrics calculated from 
stock exchange data (e.g. Jensen’s alpha, Sharpe ratio). Studies that analysed stock returns are, 
for instance, Bebchuk et al. [2009] Eccles et al. [2014], Edmans [2012], Kovács et al. [2011] In 
the empirical section, we analyse the net profit margin (ROS). Several studies used ROS as the 
dependent variable, see, for instance, Callan and Thomas [2009], Griffin and Mahon [1997], 
Hart and Ahuja [1996], Qiu et al. [2016], Waddock and Graves [1998], Wagner [2005].
We test the hypothesis that companies with high ESG performance retain significantly higher 
financial profitability than companies with low ESG ratings. Our hypothesis is in line with stake-
holder theory, good management theory and the resource-based view of firms. We first analyse 
company ESG performance separately (E, S and G), then together (ESG score). The reference 
period covers 2018, i.e. the focus is on the short-term profitability effect of ESG factors.
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The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In the second section, we present the brief 
conceptual framework of ESG investing. The next section introduces the database compiled and 
built for the empirical analysis. Subsequently, we describe the applied methodology. Finally, we 
present our empirical findings. The paper ends with a conclusion.
Conceptual framework
The conceptual framework underlying this paper originates from the theory of corporate valua-
tion. ‘Value’, interpreted either at the firm or equity level, is most often measured by the present 
value of expected future cash flows:
(1)
where Cash flowt is the expected cash flow in period t and rt is the required rate of return (cost 
of capital) reflecting the riskiness of the business. There is a growing perpetuity version of the 
above formula:
(2)
where g measures the long-term sustainable growth rate of profits. Based on Equation (2), expe-
cted future cash flows, riskiness, and growth determine valuation. The following formula is a 
version of the Residual Income (RI) model (for more information on RI see, for instance, Juhász 
[2018] or Ehrbar [1998]):
(3)
where E0 is the present value of equity, St-1 is the net sales in period t-1, gt is the expected growth 
rate of net sales in period t, ROSt is the net profit margin during t, BV(Et-1) is the book value of 
equity at the beginning of t, rEt is the required rate of return on equity. According to Equation (3), 
if a firm increases its profitability (profit margin, ROS), it will also increase shareholder value, 
ceteris paribus.
Several factors may affect profitability, and one could be ESG-related issues. As an example, 
businesses that do not pay attention to the environment may face high environmental fines, 
lousy behaviour towards customers and local communities may lead to a drop in demand, and 
poorly managed businesses may find it challenging to adapt to the market contest. These nega-
tive phenomena (but also the positive ones) have an impact on future cash flows and their stabil-
ity; therefore, they affect profitability and share prices.
To sum up, referring to Porter – van der Linde [1995: 106] or Szabó – Juhász [2019a, 2019b] 
increasing corporate resource productivity through environmental cost leadership ‘lowers true 
economic costs and raises the true economic value of products’. Consequently, strong ESG per-
formance should have a positive effect on financial profitability. Based on the above, we define 
the following hypotheses:
H1:  Firms with higher composite ESG scores achieve a significantly higher return on sales 
ratio (ROS) than those firms which possess low ESG scores.
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H2:  Companies with higher environmental (E), social (S), and corporate governance (G) 
scores have a significantly higher return on sales ratio (ROS) than companies with low 
E, S and G scores.
Database
To perform regression calculations, we collected a corporate sample from Bloomberg. 
Observations include companies that were members of the MSCI ACWI Index in 2018. The 
constituents of the MSCI ACWI Index come from 23 developed and 26 emerging countries and 
have medium or large capitalisation. In December 2018, a total of 2,781 companies were in the 
index, and typically covered 85 per cent of the capital markets in the respective countries.
The Appendix summarises the variables involved in the analysis. Further, it also contains 
their calculation methods and Bloomberg codes. Several studies have applied the listed charac-
teristics, see, for instance, Callan and Thomas [2009], Qiu et al. [2016], Russo and Fouts [1997], 
Wagner [2005]. The dependent variable is the return on sales (ROS) for 2018. Sustainalytics2 
provides E, S, and G, as well as combined ESG scores to Bloomberg. The ratings range from 0 to 
100, and higher values indicate better ESG performance.
Control variables include the 2017 return on sales, company size, leverage, capital intensity, 
growth, industry and geographic dummies. Assets, net sales, and market capitalisation describe 
the size factor (to have a linear relationship between the dependent and explanatory variables 
we calculate their natural logarithm). The following firm characteristics represent indebtedness: 
book leverage, market-based leverage, and net debt to assets ratio. We measure growth also with 
three variables. These are as follows: the growth rate of assets, sales, and profit after tax between 
2016 and 2018.
Our initial database included 2,781 companies; however, many did not disclose ESG scores, 
and several were not traded in 2017; hence they also lacked ROS for 2017. Consequently, we 
excluded every company that even had one missing data (listwise deletion)3. After the primary 
screening, 1,492 businesses remained in the database.
In the next step, we excluded firms that had extreme values for either the dependent or 
explanatory variables, given that the regression methodology is very sensitive to these [Kovács, 
2014]. Extreme observations are those that are beyond three times the interquartile range (lower 
limit: Q1 - 3 x IQR; upper limit: Q3 + 3 x IQR). After the secondary screening, the sample con-
sists of 1,100 companies. Table 1 summarises the descriptive statistics for each variable.
Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Factor Variable Unit Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation
Profitability ROS % -36.54 62.50 11.86 10.18
Profitability (previous year) ROS_17 % -34.42 57.69 11.49 10.39
2 Sustainalytics is one of the leading global ESG rating agency founded in 1992.
3  An appropriate procedure for managing missing data could have been the so-called “Multiple Imputation 
(MI)” method, that we, however, discarded due to the large portion of missing ESG scores.
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Firm size (SIZE)
MCAP ln 7.10 13.55 9.55 1.04
ASSETS ln 6.45 13.86 9.70 1.21
SALES ln 5.35 13.12 9.18 1.20
Leverage (LEV)
BLEV % 0.00 138.30 36.58 23.88
MLEV % 0.00 88.47 22.74 18.14
DA % 0.00 93.66 23.33 16.76
Capital intensity (CAP) CAP - 0.22 12.67 2.29 2.17
Growth rate (GRO)
gASSETS % -16.38 30.07 5.98 6.66
gSALES % -18.16 29.66 6.02 6.05
gPAT % -57.71 75.13 8.79 20.29
ESG
ESG - 28.41 68.26 50.39 9.49
E - 28.84 67.75 50.40 9.45
S - 28.52 68.30 50.39 9.57
G - 29.29 67.94 50.30 9.77
Dummy factor Dummy variables Abbreviation Observations№ distribution
Sectors (SEC)
Communication services CS 76 6.91%
Consumer discretionary CD 170 15.45%
Consumer staples CST 95 8.64%
Energy EN 48 4.36%
Financials FI 81 7.36%
Health care HC 97 8.82%
Industrials IN 215 19.55%
Information technology IT 113 10.27%
Materials MA 94 8.55%
Real estate RE 52 4.73%
Utility UT 59 5.36%
Regions (REG)
Americas A 465 42.27%
Europe, the Middle East  
and Africa EMEA 291 26.45%
Asia-Pacific AP 344 31.27%
Influential 
observations Minimum Maximum Mean Standard deviation № of observations
Cook’s distance 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.00 1 100
Leverage 0.01 0.12 0.02 0.01 1 100
Notes: The sector (SEC) classification rests on the MSCI Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS).
Source: Own compilation
The middle part of the table contains descriptive statistics about the dummy variables. More 
than 45 per cent of the companies operated in the consumer discretionary, IT and industrials 
sectors in 2018. In regional terms, the predominance of American companies (42.27 per cent) is 
apparent. The fewest companies are from the EMEA region (291).
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According to Table 1, the relative standard deviations are typically less than two, and there 
are no influential observations in the sample (the highest Cook’s distance is very close to 0, and 
the maximum leverage is below 0.2), i.e. the database is suitable for further analysis.
Table 1 and the Appendix show that we treat firm size, leverage, and growth with more varia-
bles, hence, we can interpret firm characteristics in a sophisticated way. However, one would face 
high multicollinearity in modelling if each variable enters in the analysis at once. It is necessary 
to combine these corporate variables somehow to avoid the confusing degree of multicollin-
earity. An obvious solution would be to calculate simple averages, but this would ignore the 
correlations between the variables. For this reason, in the framework of principal component 
analysis (PCA), we combine the firm characteristics into common factors, namely size, leverage 
and growth.
Econometric Models and Estimation Methods
Raw ESG scores are only suitable for comparison within industries, which is a ‘unique’ feature 
of Sustainalytics’s database. Therefore, it is necessary to make some transformation. To this end, 
we follow the normalisation procedures of Morningstar tailored to Sustainalytics rating system 
[Justice and Hale, 2016]. First, we obtain ESG z-scores:
(4)
where ESGi is the Sustainalytics ESG score for firm i, μpeer is the peer group average ESG score, 
and σpeer is the standard deviation of the ESG scores for the same peer group.
Next, we recalculate standardised ESG scores by using Equation (5) to have scores between 0 
and 100 again, but now individual company-level ESG scores are comparable across industries:
(5)
Equation (5) is the normalisation formula, with an average score of 50.
We estimate a linear regression model based on the following general equations (we calculate 
different equations owing to high multicollinearity between each ESG variable; see, for example, 
Qiu et al. [2016]).
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 ∑ 𝛽𝛽����� 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺�� �  ���   (8) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅�� �  𝛽𝛽� �  𝛽𝛽�𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅���� �  𝛽𝛽�𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆�� � 𝛽𝛽�𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿�� � 𝛽𝛽�𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶�� �  𝛽𝛽�𝐺𝐺𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅�� �  𝛽𝛽�𝐺𝐺�� � ∑ 𝛽𝛽������ 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶�� �
 ∑ 𝛽𝛽����� 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝐺𝐺�� �  ���   (9) 
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In the above regressions, the dependent variable is the 2018 return on sales ratio (ROS). Among 
the explanatory variables, the primary focus is on the E, S, G, and combined ESG scores. 
Following prior literature, we control for firm size (see, for instance, [Brammer and Pavelin, 
2008, 2006; Cormier and Magnan, 2003; Dhaliwal et al., 2011; Patten, 1991; Qiu et al., 2016]), 
leverage [Brammer and Pavelin, 2008, 2006; Cormier et al., 2011; Cormier and Magnan, 2003; 
Qiu et al., 2016], capital intensity [Russo and Fouts, 1997; Schaltegger and Figge, 2000; Wagner, 
2005], growth [Capon et al., 1990; Russo and Fouts, 1997], industry and country dummies 
[Patten, 1991; Qiu et al., 2016; Wagner, 2005]. 
In the literature, the ordinary least squares (OLS) method is one of the general approaches 
to estimate similar models (see, among other, [Qiu et al., 2016; Russo and Fouts, 1997; Wagner, 
2005]). According to Wooldridge [2013], the conclusions of ordinary least squares could be con-
sidered as the best linear unbiased estimates (BLUE) if the Gaussian-Markov (GM) standard 
assumptions are met. The GM assumptions: the variables are linear, exact multicollinearity does 
not exist, there is strict exogeneity, but no homoskedasticity and autocorrelation among the error 
terms (the latter is not relevant for cross-sectional data). The normality of the errors is not part 
of the GM model assumptions. If it is not satisfied, but a sufficiently large sample is analysed, 
the results obtained can be still valid as an asymptotic approximation due to the central limit 
theorem. The assumption of homoskedasticity does not hold; therefore, we apply the weighted 
least squares (WLS) method.
Results
Table 2 presents the results of the WLS regressions. It shows the coefficients of the explanatory 
variables of Equations (6), (7), (8) and (9) described in the previous section, as well as the related 
statistics such as the standard errors, empirical significance levels, adjusted R2, F-tests and the 
maximum values of Cook’s distances.
Based on the F-tests, one can conclude that the explanatory variables together significantly 
explain profitability; therefore, the linear relationship is also valid. The adjusted R2 values are 
around 53 to 54 per cent, i.e. the model has adequate explanatory power. Cook’s distances are 
below the critical value of 1; hence there are not any highly influential outlier observations in the 
sample. It is important to note that the final sample size decreased further by 1 to 1,099. Some 
‘pre-run’ regressions indicated that one of the companies still has an excessive influence on the 
sample; therefore, it was omitted from the analysis (is was Mattel, the American toy manufac-
turer giant, Bloomberg ticker: MAT UW Equity).
Table 2: Results of regression calculations
Model
Variables
(6) (7) (8) (9)
β Std. err. Sig. β
Std. 
err. Sig. β
Std. 
err. Sig. β
Std. 
err. Sig.
Constant 4.96 1.74 *** 5.97 1.72 *** 5.65 1.76 *** 3.14 1.77 *
ROS_17 0.54 0.02 *** 0.54 0.02 *** 0.54 0.02 *** 0.54 0.02 ***
SIZE -0.29 0.17 * -0.27 0.17 -0.29 0.17 * -0.24 0.16
LEV -0.05 0.01 *** -0.06 0.01 *** -0.05 0.01 *** -0.06 0.01 ***
CAP 1.35 0.15 *** 1.36 0.15 *** 1.36 0.15 *** 1.35 0.15 ***
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GRO 0.04 0.02 ** 0.04 0.02 ** 0.04 0.02 ** 0.04 0.02 **
ESG 0.01 0.02
E -0.01 0.02
S 0.00 0.02
G 0.03 0.02 **
CS 1.23 0.90 1.22 0.89 1.27 0.89 1.19 0.90
CD 0.56 0.44 0.47 0.43 0.52 0.44 0.53 0.43
CST 0.01 0.45 -0.08 0.45 -0.07 0.45 -0.01 0.44
EN 0.20 0.87 0.02 0.84 0.14 0.87 0.29 0.85
FI -2.62 0.98 *** -2.80 0.99 *** -2.77 0.99 *** -2.51 0.97 ***
HC 1.41 0.89 1.51 0.90 * 1.45 0.90 1.41 0.89
IT 2.86 0.75 *** 2.86 0.75 *** 2.86 0.75 *** 2.81 0.75 ***
MA -0.08 0.57 -0.16 0.57 -0.10 0.57 -0.06 0.57
RE 0.99 1.25 1.04 1.22 1.02 1.26 0.96 1.22
UT -1.65 0.62 *** -1.78 0.62 *** -1.76 0.62 *** -1.48 0.59 **
A 2.22 0.45 *** 2.11 0.44 *** 2.14 0.46 *** 2.34 0.43 ***
AP -0.72 0.38 * -0.87 0.35 ** -0.85 0.38 ** -0.43 0.39
Adj. R2 0.55 0.56 0.55 0.56
F 76.57 77.56 76.23 79.92
p-value 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 *** 0.00 ***
Max. 
Cook’s D 0.48 0.39 0.39 0.20
Notes: The dependent variable is the return on sales (ROS).
Regressions are estimated using the weighted least squares (WLS) method. The definition of each vari-
able is in Table 1 and the Appendix. Among the dummy variables, due to exact multicollinearity, the 
variables IN (industrials) and EMEA (Europe, the Middle East, and Africa) were excluded.
*, **, and *** indicate that the given variable is significant at 10, 5, and 1 per cent, respectively.
Source: Own compilation
Firstly, most of the control variables are significant at least at 5.00 per cent and coincide with 
preliminary expectations. If the previous year’s (2017) ROS is 1.00 percentage points higher, the 
2018 ROS increase approximately 0.54 percentage, ceteris paribus. We measured the size factor 
in logarithmic form; thus, it shows that a 1.00 per cent growth in size decrease profitability by 
0.29/100 basis points (Equation (6)). Although the size factor is significant at 10 per cent in two 
cases (Equation (6) and (8)), but its practical interpretability is low. Further, size is not significant 
in model (7) and (9). A 1.00 percentage point surge in indebtedness reduces profitability by 5-6 
basis points, assuming everything else is unchanged. If capital intensity rises by one unit (this 
means an increase of almost 44 per cent from the average value of 2.29), then profitability grows 
by 1.35 percentage points. A 1.00 percentage point upward shift in the growth rate will result in a 
4.00 basis point improvement in profitability. A notable finding is that in 2018 companies opera-
ting in the Americas (typically US companies) outperformed companies from the EMEA region 
by 2.10-2.35 percentage points. In contrast, companies in the Asian region typically underper-
form firms in the EMEA region. We now turn to the issue of ESG’s profitability-effects. The 
regression coefficient of the composite ESG rating does not deviate significantly from zero, so we 
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must reject H1. In other words, our calculations do not support the higher profitability of com-
panies with improved ESG scores. We cannot accept H2 at the usual significance levels either, 
at least for environmental (E) and social (S) scores. If environmental or social rating increase, 
financial performance does not change significantly. Our results are in line with [Garcia-Castro 
et al., 2010; McWilliams and Siegel, 2001, 2000].
In contrast to the previous findings, the corporate governance factor (G) coefficient is signif-
icant at 5.00 per cent and has a positive impact on financial performance; therefore, it confirms 
H2. Firms with higher G scores significantly outperform firms with lower scores. If the G score 
increases by 10 points, the return on sales ratio become higher by 30 basis points, ceteris pari-
bus. In the hypothetical case, if a business jumped from the minimum score 0 to the maximum 
100, profitability would increase by 3.00 percentage points. Our result corroborates the findings 
of [Brown and Caylor, 2006; Core et al., 2006; Giroud and Mueller, 2010] and consistent with 
stakeholder theory, good management theory and the resource-based view of firms.
Besides, a further important conclusion is that social and environmental factors, which 
often interpreted as mere costs, do not significantly reduce even short-term profitability. This 
latter finding implies that it is socially rewarding for companies to invest in ESG projects as they 
will not experience evaporating profits but might contribute to reach and maintain sustaina-
ble growth. This finding is consistent with the argument from Revelli and Viviani [2015]. Also, 
companies that pay attention to environmental and social concerns foster achieving some of 
the Sustainable Development Goals of the United Nations. These objectives, among others, are 
gender equality, inclusive and sustainable economic growth, full and productive employment 
and decent work, sustainable consumption and production, mitigation of climate change and 
its impacts. Promoting such goals, in turn, could help reduce risks threatening economies and 
societies.
As a robustness check, we executed the regression analyses using stepwise procedures. Table 
3 summarises the results.
Table 3: Robustness check, regression with stepwise procedures
Variables β Standard error p-value Sig. Tolerance VIF
ROS_17 0.55 0.02 0.00 *** 0.44 2.29
LEV -0.06 0.01 0.00 *** 0.23 4.28
CAP 1.41 0.14 0.00 *** 0.27 3.74
GRO 0.05 0.02 0.01 ** 0.46 2.20
G 0.05 0.01 0.00 *** 0.20 5.27
FI -3.11 0.93 0.00 *** 0.78 1.29
IT 2.56 0.72 0.00 *** 0.93 1.08
UT -1.76 0.59 0.00 *** 0.78 1.29
A 2.65 0.37 0.00 *** 0.74 1.35
Adj. R2 0.79   Max Condition index: 5.73
F 456.49 Max Cook’s D 0.47
p-value 0.00 *** Max Leverage 0.13
Source: Own compilation
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The findings are similar to Equations (6)-(9), seeing that ESG, E and S dropped out from the final 
model. Further, in line with our primary findings, the governance factor is significant, but here 
even at 1.00 per cent. Moreover, the coefficient is higher than before (45 basis points). The coeffi-
cients of the control variables remained close to the original model estimates and are typically 
significant at 1.00 per cent (the size variable is still insignificant).
Conclusion
In this study, we employed the ESG concept (environmental, social and governance) to test one 
of the dominant management literature hypotheses, namely the existence of a positive ESG-
financial performance relationship. Environmental criteria consider how companies perform as 
supporters of nature and often referred to as corporate externality risks. Social measures sum-
marise reputational issues, i.e. how companies take care of their primary stakeholders, including 
employees, suppliers, customers. Corporate governance deals with company leadership, such as 
executive pays, audits, internal controls, financial reporting and minority investor rights. Many 
times, scholars consider governance policies as agency problems.
To perform the analysis, we collected a 1,099-element corporate sample from Bloomberg. 
Observations include companies that were members of the MSCI ACWI Index in 2018. 
Regression calculations relied on the weighted least squares (WLS) method. The dependent var-
iable was the return on sales ratio (ROS, 2018); the control variables were previous year (2017) 
profitability, size, leverage, growth, capital intensity, industry and regional dummies. To interpret 
corporate size, leverage, and growth in a more sophisticated way, we used three firm characteris-
tics for each. However, to avoid high multicollinearity, but to consider correlations between the 
variables, we applied principal component analysis.
Our findings indicate that higher ESG, E, and S ratings did not significantly change the 
profitability in the short run. However, corporate governance had a significant and positive 
effect at 5.00 per cent: a 10-point increase in G score increased ROS by 0.30 percentage points. 
Another important conclusion is that social and environmental factors, which often inter-
preted as mere costs, did not significantly reduce short-term profitability. This latter finding 
implies that companies should invest in ESG projects as they will not experience evaporating 
profits but might contribute to reach some of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of 
the United Nations.  
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Appendix
Variables in the analysis
Factor Variable Abbr. Calculation Bloomberg code
Profitability Return on  sales (2018) ROS
Profit after tax (2018) / Net sales 
(2018) PROF_MARGIN
Profitability 
(t-1)
Return on sales 
(2017) ROS_17
Profit after tax (2017) / Net 
sales (2017) PROF_MARGIN
Firm size 
(SIZE)
Market 
capitalization (2018) MCAP
ln(Number of shares * Price/
share) (28.12.2018.) CUR_MKT_CAP
Assets (2018) ASSETS ln(Fixed plus current assets) (at the end of 2018) BS_TOT_ASSET
Net sales (2018) SALES ln(Net sales) (2018) SALES_REV_TURN
Leverage 
(LEV)
Book leverage 
(2018) BLEV
LT debt. + max(ST debt - 
Cash; 0) / Equity + LT debt 
+ max(ST debt - Cash; 0) (at 
the end of 2018)
BS_LT_BORROW
BS_TOT_ASSETS
CASH_AND_
MERKETABLE
EQY_SH_OUT
PX_LAST
TOT_COMMON_
EQY
Market 
capitalisation based 
leverage (2018)
MLEV
LT debt. + max(ST debt - 
Cash; 0) / Market cap + LT 
debt + max(ST debt - Cash; 
0) (at the end of 2018)
Net debt/Assets DA
LT debt + max(ST debt - 
Cash; 0) / Assets
(at the end of 2018)
Capital 
intensity
Capital intensity 
(2018) CAP
Assets (at the end of 2018) / 
Net sales (2018)
BS_TOT_ASSET
SALES_REV_TURN
Growth rate
Average growth 
rate of assets (2016-
2018)
gASSETS
Average growth in assets 
(2016-2018) / Average of the 
assets (2016-2018)
BS_TOT_ASSET
SALES_REV_TURN
IS_INC_BEF_XO_
ITEM
Average growth rate 
of net sales (2016-
2018)
gSALES
Average growth in net sales 
(2016-2018) / Average net 
sales (2016-2018)
Average growth rate 
of profit after tax 
(2016-2018)
gPAT
Average growth in profit after 
tax (2016-2018) / Average 
profit after tax (2016-2018)
ESG score
ESG score (2018) ESG
Scores of Sustainalytics 
SUSTAINALYTICS_
RANK
SUSTAINALYTICS_
ENVIRONMEN
SUSTAINALYTICS_
SOCIAL
SUSTAINALYTICS_
GOVERNANCE
Environment score 
(2018) E
Social score (2018) S
Governance score 
(2018) G
(continued)
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Factor Variable Abbr. Calculation Bloomberg code
Sectors
Communication services CS
GICS classification 
(dummy variables)
GICS_
SECTOR_
NAME
Consumer discretionary CD
Consumer staples CST
Energy EN
Financials FI
Health care HC
Industrials IN
Information technology IT
Materials MA
Real estate RE
Utility UT
Regions
Americas A
MSCI classification 
(dummy variables) -
Europe, the Middle East and 
Africa EMEA
Asia-Pacific AP
Notes: The dependent variable is the ROS 2018.
Source: Own compilation
